Not easy, fast or cheap: A framework for identifying the real cost of REDD+

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Presentation based on:

- Hans Gregersen, Hosny El-Lakany, Alain Karsenty and Andy White (2010),
- Do Opportunity Costs Indicate the Real Compensation for Successful REDD+ ? : Rights and Realities of paying for REDD+. http://www.rightsandresources.org/publicatio n details

Objective of presentation

- To examine whether the opportunity cost (O C) approach used in many of the major global climate change studies provides realistic estimates of what payments will be needed to achieve a successful REDD+ program.
- To help guide the international debate about a REDD+ scheme

Outline

- What is Opportunity Cost (OC)?
- What are the issues in using it to estimate what payments will be needed?
- Discussion of the contextual issues
- The way ahead
 - Dealing with governance
 - Using the three main tools available to governments: laws/regulations, subsidies and government investment
- Conclusions

- Opportunity cost of deforestation or degradation: the net value foregone by the owner of the rights to the forest if the forest is protected instead of being removed and the land used to produce other outputs.
- Example:
- If the forest owner intends to deforest a ha. and produce palm oil on the ha. that would give the forest owner a *net* return of \$ 600 per ha./yr., then \$600/ha./yr is the owner's OC.

OC is *theoretically* satisfactory indicator.

- However, there are major contextual and governance issues that make it less useful:
- 1. controlling corruption and illegal activity,
- 2. increasing transparency and accountability,
- 3. resolving basic property and use rights issues,
- 4. getting adequate technical and financial capacity,
- 5. figuring ways to avoid leakage and "environmental blackmail."

DETERMINING WHEN OC IS A USEFUL INDICATOR IN THE REAL WORLD

- Without resolving these issues, we could be underestimating the real costs and misguiding the debate and design of REDD+ programs.
- To determine usefulness, we need to look at drivers of deforestation and the legality of their deforestation: 3 situations:
 - Clearly *illegal* to remove the forest
 - Clearly *legal* to remove the forest
 - Legal use rights not clearly defined and assigned

WHEN DEFORESTATION IS ILLEGAL:

- forbidden by zoning laws/regulations, or
- those deforesting have no legal rights to the forest

IN THIS CASE:

OC is not appropriate

- You don't pay someone not to commit a crime

- Instead, either
 - enforce the law or
 - Change the law (e.g., tenure reform)

WHEN REMOVAL OF FOREST IS LEGAL

Appropriateness of using O C depends on:

- kind of forest owner/agent and
- socio-political context.

Four main relevant groups:

- (1) Government entities,
- (2) Entities with clear use rights but mainly operating outside the market economy
- (3) Private entities with clear title to their land and operating in the market economy
- (4) Public corporations, e.g., corporate logging, livestock, soy bean, biofuel crops, etc.

1) Governments

- Governments can deforest, indirectly or directly, through, for example:
- 1. resettlement or land reform programs;
- 2. forest concessions;
- 3. lack of adequate means to halt illegal logging and corruption;
- 4. laws that lead to deforestation, (e.g., some agricultural development laws/subsidies, etc.)
- 5. Building of infrastructure (roads, dams, etc.)

Governments (cont.): payments needed to halt:

- 1. Resettlement/Land reform
 - *Relevant cost*: economic development foregone.
 How calculate that? If politically driven, halting it may be unacceptable to govt. Thus OC irrelevant
- **2. Forest concessions:**
 - *Relevant cost*: loss of concession fees, log taxes, employment lost, export taxes, and other benefits to country associated with economic development.

Governments (cont.): Payments needed to:

- 3. Develop adequate enforcement of laws against illegal logging and corruption;
 - Relevant cost: is cost to government of adequate enforcement to stop illegal logging and corruption
- 4. Get rid of perverse laws
 - Relevant cost: the benefits foregone by not stimulating the activity being subsidized.
- 5. Stop infrastructure projects
 - Relevant cost: economic development benefits foregone. How estimate?

2) Individuals, Communities with clear *legal land rights* but existing *outside* the main market economy

- OC is only a starting point for determining needed payments.
- Other likely needed costs would include significant investments in new livelihood options, housing, etc. Otherwise leakage is bound to occur.
- Transactions costs can be high.

3) Individuals, Communities and Private firms with *clear legal land rights* and existing *within* the market economy

- OC could be a relevant indicator as a starting point for REDD+ payments negotiations.
- However, additionality criterion needs to be considered. "<u>Environmental blackmail</u>" is a big risk (i.e., they say they would deforest without the payment when in fact it would not have happened).

4. Corporations with legal rights to land or forest

- Have fiduciary obligations to their shareholders to keep operating or make a better return by not operating or operating in a different way.
- If other, better non-forest investments opportunities are available, then potential forest sale price is relevant starting point.
- However, if only other forest options available, leakage will take place, (possibly in another country),
- Then OC is irrelevant, since the corporation should not be paid not to deforest, (applying the additionality criterion).

LEGAL USE RIGHTS NOT CLEARLY DEFINED AND ASSIGNED

- (Indigenous Peoples, Forest Comm., Migrant farmers with only *traditional* land rights and generally outside the market economy).
- If RIGHTS not legally recognized, they cannot make REDD contracts; thus their OC is irrelevant.
- Need is to legally assign and recognize rights through tenure reform.
- Even if legal rights are given, payment equal to OC is not enough: would need massive complementary investments in housing, alternative livelihood creation, education, etc. to avoid leakage

In summary:

- The concept of OC has widespread appeal and is widely used, particularly in global assessments that include consideration of REDD+.
- However, it is evident that it probably will be of limited use in deciding what actually needs to be paid to forest owners and users not to deforest.
- If forest owners become involved in carbon offset markets, market price is the relevant figure, not the owners' individual OCs.

The way ahead: Helping governments craft the right REDD+ response framework

REDD+ debate should shift to focus on:

- (a) costs and issues involved in improving forest governance; and
- (b) longer term institutional investment costs that will need to be incurred to ensure effective REDD+ programs that also protect biodiversity and help forest dwellers move out of poverty.
 These needs require a focus at the country level.

In the context of forest governance, three broad categories of instruments are available to governments and useful in influencing those who own or control forests:

- 1. Laws and regulations
- 2. Fiscal mechanisms (taxes and subsidies)
- **3.** Public investments of various sorts.

In what follows, we look at the options for each of these three policy tools.

1) LAWS AND REGULATIONS

- A) Tenure reform: Assigning and clarifying forest tenure and rights
- **B) improving the enforcement of forest laws**
- C) rationalizing forest harvest contracts for harvest on public lands and encouraging low impact logging where feasible;
- D) Rationalizing intersectoral policies and laws to discourage deforestation.

2) FISCAL MECHANISMS – TAXES AND INCENTIVE PAYMENTS:

- A) Eliminate perverse subsidies,
- **B)** Subsidies and tax incentives to encourage:
 - restructuring of some industries
 - the agriculture sector to improve productivity on existing agricultural lands
- **C)** expanding micro credit programs
- D) using fiscal mechanisms to encourage industries to source their inputs from legal sources.

3) PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN:

- A) forest tenure reform programs as needed.
- B) education, extension, research as needed.
- C) design and distribution of fuel efficient stoves and charcoal production systems.
- D) afforestation, reforestation and rehabilitation of degraded lands (ARRDL) as a necessary complement to REDD.
- E) programs to ensure maximum co-benefits.
- F) Programs to ensure fair sharing of REDD benefits/payments.

Conclusions

- 1. Good governance is a prerequisite for success.
- 2. Resolving institutional issues is key.
- 3. OC is not a very useful indicator on payments needed except in a few cases.
- 4. Governments should draw on all three sets of instruments available to them. (laws/regulations, fiscal and public investment).
- 5. Make sure that co-benefits to REDD are considered as well as benefit sharing;
- 6. Be flexible: this is a dynamic not static world. Costs change over time.

Thank you